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amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de - - [15/Oct/1997:11:50:01] "GET
/lvbeschr/winter/TechnDS.html HTTP/1.0" - "http://wwwtcs.inf.tu-
dresden.de/IKT/" "Mozilla/3.01 (X11; I; SunOS 5.5.1 sun4u)"
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>tail syslog
Oct 15 16:32:06 from=<feder@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>, size=1150
Oct 15 16:32:06 to=<hf2@irz.inf.tu-dresden.de>
> Logging and Observation of user actions
Logging of e-mail communication
Logging of web access
Linkage of user actions
wwwtcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>tail access_log
amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de - - [15/Oct/1997:11:50:01] "GET
/lvbeschr/winter/TechnDS.html HTTP/1.0" - "http://wwwtcs.inf.tu-
dresden.de/IKT/" "Mozilla/3.01 (X11; I; SunOS 5.5.1 sun4u)"
ithif19 logs 17 >finger @amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de
[amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de]
Login       Name               TTY         Idle    When
feder    Hannes Federrath      console             Wed 11:56
>tail syslog
Oct 15 16:32:06 from=<feder@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>, size=1150
Oct 15 16:32:06 to=<hf2@irz.inf.tu-dresden.de>
> Logging and Observation of user actions
Logging of e-mail communication
Logging of web access
Linkage of user actions
> Anonymity in the Internet is an illusion
z Know your enemy!
÷ Competitors
÷ Security Agencies of foreign countries
÷ Big Brothers
÷ Neighbors...
http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/ic2kreport.htm
High frequency radio interception antenna (AN/FLR9)
> Anonymity in the Internet is an illusion
z Know your enemy!
÷ Competitors
÷ Security Agencies of foreign countries
÷ Big Brothers
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The Internet
z Telecommunication networks:
÷ many operators
÷ many users
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> Observation of users in switched networks
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• staff
Network termination
Encryption
• Link-to-link encryption
• End-to-end encryption of contents
Problem – Traffic data:
Who communicates with whom, how long, where?
Who ist interested in which contents?
We need concepts that hide traffic data (or avoid it).
eavesdropper
>>> Observation of users in switched networks
Confidentiality of content by means of Encryption
z Symmetric Encryption, e.g. DES, IDEA, AES
÷ Both communication partners share a secret key for encryption
and decryption
÷ Security is based on a „chaos machine“
÷ Key length approx 128 bits
z Asymmetric Encryption (Public Key Encryption), e.g. RSA
÷ Each user generates a key pair:
±public encryption key
±private (and secret) decryption key
÷ Security is based on hard problems in number theory
÷ Key length > 1024 bits
new: elliptic curve cryptography approx. 160 bits
z Well-known encryption software:
÷ Pretty Good Privacy
÷ http://www.pgp.com
> Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
http://www.pgp.com
> Protection against observation?
z New challenges:
÷ Privacy in the Internet:
÷ Protection against “Profiling” and commercial use of private data
without consent.
z Part of Privacy; here: confidentiality of traffic data
z Encryption does not help against observation
÷ Who is communicating with whom?
z Anonymity:
÷ The sender and/or recipient stay anonymous to each other.
z Unobservability:
÷ All parties (incl. network operators) cannot trace communication
relations.
÷ Sending and/or receiving of messages is unobservable
z Remarks:
÷ A single event caused by a single user cannot be anonymous or
unobservable.
÷ We need a group of users where all users behave similarly.
Observation of
communication
relations may give
information about
contents
> Why encryption is not enough
Attorney Miller,
specialized in
mergers
anonymity group «event»
message
access
> Anonymity and unobservability
Everybody can be the originator of an «event» with an equal likelyhood
Assuming a very
strong attacker is
the best way to
achieve real
security.
> Our attacker model
z Attacker may:
÷ observe all communication links,
÷ send own messages,
÷ operate anonymity services (all but one ...)
÷ operate a server (web server)
z Attacker cannot:
÷ break into cryptographic systems,
÷ attack the users personal machine,
÷ has limited time and computing power
Existing systems for HTTP (real-time communication)
z Simple Proxies (partly with filtering functions: Cookies, JavaScript, active content)
÷ Anonymizer.com (Lance Cottrel)
÷ Aixs.net
÷ ProxyMate.com (Lucent Personal Web Assistant, Bell Labs)
÷ Rewebber.com (Andreas Rieke, Thomas Demuth, FernUni Hagen)
÷ Anon proxy (Hannes Federrath)
÷ Each appropriate configured web server with proxy functions
z Systems considering traffic analysis
÷ Crowds (Mike Reiter, AT&T)
÷ Onion-Routing (Naval Research Center)
÷ Freedom (Ian Goldberg, Zero-Knowledge Inc.)
÷ WebIncognito (Privada)
÷ WebMixes (TU Dresden)
> Simple Proxies
z Server has no information about
the real originator of request
z No protection against the
operator
z No protection against traffic
analysis
z Principles for Web access:
1. Form-based
÷ Type in URL
÷ Proxy gets the URL on behalf
of user
2. Change browser config
÷ „use proxy“
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>> Simple Proxies
z Proxy gets to know all contents!!!
z Observation is possible
÷ Timing correlation of incoming and outgoing requests
÷ Correlation by message length and coding
÷ Simple encryption between user and proxy is not sufficient
because of the correlation of timing and length and it does not
help against the operator
User U P A
honest
page.html
> Cascading Simple Proxies
z Link-to-link encryption between proxies
z Does not help to avoid observation by operators
P B P C
bad bad
Server S
page.html page.html
kUA(page.html) kAB(page.html) kBC(page.html) kCS(page.html)
z Each communication request is sent directly to the server with a
probability of P
z Else the request is sent to another user (Jondo) of the crowd
(with 1-P)
z Symmetric link-encryption between the users
÷ Avoid linkability
÷ However: timing coincidence
z Enbedded objects (images etc.) are requested by the last Jondo
÷ Suppress bursts of requests
z Security goal:
÷ Every user can deny that
he or she is the originator
of a certain request
z Problem:
÷ Jondos get to know about
content of a request and response
Initiator
> Crowds
AT&T
z Hiding of routing information in connection oriented communication
relations
z Nested public key encryption
z Uses an expiration_time field to reduce cost of replay detection
z Dummy traffic between MIXes (Onion Routers)
z First/Last-Hop-Attacks:
÷ Timing correlations
÷ Message length
exp_timeX, Y, key_seedX,X
Y
Z
> Onion Routing
exp_timeY, Z, key_seedY,
exp_timeZ, NULL, key_seedZ,
US Naval Research Center
> Attacks
z Systems considering traffic analysis have to avoid all of the following
possible attacks
÷ Timing attacks: Observe the duration of a communication by
linking the possible endpoints of a communication and wait for a
correlation between the creation and/or release event at all
possible endpoints.
÷ Message volume attacks: Observe the amount of transmitted
data (i.e. the message length) and correlate input and output.
÷ Flooding attacks: Each message can only be anonymous in a
group of messages (batch). Under normal circumstances, each
sender sends one message per batch. A good system has to
avoid that the batch can be flooded by an attacker in order to
separate a certain message.
÷ Linking attacks: Because of online/offline-periods of the users an
attacker may create intersections of anonymity groups by
observation over a long period.
z At this time, no existing system withstands all attacks
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Mixes (David Chaum, 1981)
z Basic idea:
÷ Sample messages in a batch, change their coding and forward
them all at the same point oftime but in a different order. All
messages have the same length.
÷ Use more than one Mix, operated by different operators.
÷ At least one Mix should not be corrupt.
z Then:
÷ Perfect unlinkability of sender and recipient.
> How a MIX works
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Mixes: some cryptography
÷ Use a public key cryptosystem:
÷ ci(...) is an encrypted message for Mix i (everybody can encrypt
messages for Mixes using this function)
÷ di(...) is the private function of Mix i to decrypt messages (only Mix i can
decrypt his messages, nobody else)
÷ Ai is the address of Mix i; ri are random numbers (dropped by the Mix)
÷ M is the message for the recipient (including his address)
MIX 1 MIX 2
A1, c1(A2, c2(M, r2) , r1)
d1(c1(...))
A2, c2(M, r2)
d2(c2 (M, r2))
M
MIX
c(M)
Mc(M     )
=?
> Mixes: Why do we need random numbers?
z If no random numbers r used:
÷ Everyone can encrypt the output messages of a Mix because
c(...) is public
÷ Compare results with all incoming messages
÷ Need a indeterministic encryption scheme (or use random
numbers)
MIX
c(M)
Mc(M, r )
=?
>> Mixes: Why do we need random numbers?
z If no random numbers r used:
÷ Everyone can encrypt the output messages of a Mix because
c(...) is public
÷ Compare results with all incoming messages
÷ Need a indeterministic encryption scheme (or use random
numbers)
r never leaves the Mix
The problem of anonymous real-time communication
z Plain Mixes are good for non-real-time communication: E-Mail
z But not sufficient for real-time communication: Web, Ftp, Internet
Phone
÷ Sampling of messages means high delay, because a Mix is waits
for (another) messages the most of time.
÷ Message lengths vary in a very large interval or no support of
connection oriented services
z We need a few improvements
Arrival (independend,
exponentially
distributed)
Processing Output time
maximal number of messages or timeoutHigh delay in situations
of low traffic:
> Traffic padding
z Hide from the attacker, when a certain communication ends
z But: nobody knows, when the last user wants to end his
communication
waiting
Traffic padding
time
User 1
User 2
.
.
.
2. End of communication but users have to
send random data until the last user has
finished his connection
3. However: Nobody knows when the last user
wants to end his communication – because
nobody can distinguish real traffic from
traffic padding
1. Users have to wait until enough users
want to communicate (creation of the
anonymity group)
Example: 5 users
> Time slices and traffic padding
z Chopping of long communications into small pieces (connections or
packet size)
÷ Unobservability in the group of all processed messages at one
time slice
÷ Long communications consist of more than one time slice
÷ No linkability of time slices
waiting
time
Traffic paddingTime slice
> Dummy traffic
z Increase the amount of traffic in situations of low traffic
z Sometimes the number of users is not sufficient to fill the batch.
z This can happen in times of low traffic.
z In that case,
÷ either the use has to wait until enough messages arrive (leads to
likely high delay)
÷ or accepts, that he cannot remain anonymous,
÷ or other users send dummy traffic.
z Def.: Dummy traffic. A user sends messages at all times. When he
doesn’t want to send messages, he sends random numbers. Nobody
can make a distinction between real encrypted messages and the
random numbers.
arrival processing output
dummies
>> Dummy traffic
z Increase the amount of traffic in situations of low traffic
z Dummy traffic only between Mixes is not sufficient
z Dummy traffic has to be generated by the users
arrival processing output
dummies
Mix Mix Mixusers
Mix Mix Mixusers
> Remaining attacks
z Systems considering traffic analysis have to avoid all of the following
possible attacks:
÷ Timing attacks
÷ Message volume attacks
÷ Flooding attacks: Each message can only be anonymous in a
group of messages (batch). Under normal circumstances, each
sender sends one message per batch. Avoid that the batch can
be flooded by an attacker in order to separate a certain
message.
÷ Linking attacks: Because of the online/offline-periods of the
users an attacker may create intersections of anonymity groups
by observation over a long period.
MIX
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> The Problem of flooding Mixes
z Batch size n
z Flooding: Attacker tries to flood the Mix with his own (n-1)
messages, except one message that he wants to observe
z Attacker knows (n-1) outgoing messages. The only unknown
message is the observed message.
z In that case, the sender and recipient are uncovered.
z Solution (first hack):
÷ All incoming messages need a ticket to be processed by a Mix.
÷ Now, the attacker needs help of the (n-1) other users. However,
we assume the users will never harm themselves.
÷ Very similar to an anonymous payment system.
÷ Digital coin not traceable neither by the Mix nor the Bank.
÷ Additionally, solves the problem of payment for anonymity
systems
> The Problem of long-term observation of users
z Supposed:
÷ A user shows a nearly constant online-offline behavior (from 8 -
10 PM online everyday)
÷ Requests certain contents (web pages, his e-mail account) during
this time
÷ A lot of other people are also online and use the anonymity
service
z Attacker observes all communication links and servers, except the
anonymity service over a long time period.
z Long-term observation leads to intersections of anonymity groups
and uncovers the users behavior.
z How long it takes that an attacker to link the user actions with a high
probability depends on the size of the anonymity group and its
behavior.
z Simulation of that attack
z No good solution at this time to defend this attack.
> Web Mixes: Anonymous real-time communication
z Anonymous and unobservable transport system
÷ Mix-based proxies with additional functions to provide real-time
communication
÷ Should withstand strong (big brother) attacks
z Information service (impossible to operate a perfect Anon system)
÷ Current level of protection (Anonymity level)
÷ Trade-off between performance and protection should be decided
by the user
z Open source, as soon as core functions have been completely
implemented
÷ Client software: Java (platform independent)
÷ Server software: C/C++ (Win/NT, Linux/Unix)
z Technical and jurisdictional knowledge to serve legal issues
z Test application:
÷ anonymous drug counseling site, supervised by an counselor, but
without revealing identities
University of Technology Dresden
> Client software
University of Technology Dresden
JAP.inf.tu-dresden.de
> How does it work?
z JAP acts as
a local
proxy on
the local
machine
University of Technology Dresden
Some practical experiences
z First test version has been
launched in October 2000
z Full service has been running since
February 2001
z Hybrid encryption system of 128
bit encryption by AES (Rijndael)
and RSA/1024 bit public key
encryption
z 3 mix casades are running
z Busy hour: 500 users at the same
time are online
z about 5000 – 8000 users
z about 120 gigabyte troughput per
week
JAP.inf.tu-dresden.de
University of Technology Dresden
Browser
Cascade of MIXes:
– real-time deployable MIXes
– different operators
– different locations
– cascade: fixed sequence of servers
– secure against traffic analysis
– for better performace: more than one cascade
CA
Web 
ServerCertification Authority:
– independend of Web Mixes System
– issues certificates of public keys
Information Service:
– traffic situation
– anonymity level
– warnings
Java Anon Proxy:
– client software
– platform independend
– local proxy
– constant dummy traffic
– adaptive time-slices
– tickets against flooding
redundand Info Service requests
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> Architecture of Web Mixes
University of Technology Dresden
> Time Slice protocol
University of Technology Dresden
{Get Server/Page.html}
response
Get Server/Page.html
{Response NIL, wait, Sl, Padding}
{Response Block[i], wait, Sl, Padding}
{Response Block[i], EOF, Sl, Padding}
{Get C-Proxy, Sl}
END
Local 
proxy
Cache 
proxy
MIX MIX MIX
Create and store Sl
IF (no answer from
Server yet) AND (no
timeout)) THEN send
IF not EOF send
ELSE send
Server
IF not EOF send
ELSE send
> Some remarks about active content
z Deactivate Cookies in your browser
÷ Web server can track all activities of a user
÷ Additional filter software is very useful
±http://www.webwasher.com/
±http://www.junkbusters.com/ijb.html
÷ Filter additional “bugs” that reveal your behavior
÷ Example:very small (1x1) transparent pictures on a
website
z Deactivate all sorts of active content in your browser
÷ Java, JavaScript, ActiveX
÷ IP-Address can be observed by an attacker
÷ Unauthorized access to hard drive by ActiveX
components
> Concluding remarks
z Anonymity and unobservability in the Internet is hard to realize.
z All commercial systems like Anonymizer, Freedom etc. suppose a
weaker attacker model. They base their model on the assumption,
that the strong attacks are not realistic in the Internet.
z In 95 or more percent of observation this assumption may be right,
but not in the remainig 5 or less percent. Let’s give an example of
what we mean:
÷ Assuming that an encryption tool sufficiently encrypts 99 of 100
messages, but in one case the message is sent in clear text. –
Nobody will rely on that tool…
z That is exactly the situation using one of the existing systems.
z However, in some cases (or to defend some attacks) we do presently
not know how a secure system has to be built.
> Political and social context
z Legal enforcement of communications
÷ German Telekommunikationsüberwachungsverordnung (TKÜV)
± http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/download/telekommunikation_post/TKUEV-Entwurf.pdf
÷ European Cybercrime Convention
± http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/projets/cybercrime.htm
z Privacy laws
÷ German (new) Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)
± http://www.bfd.bund.de/information/bdsg_hinweis.html
÷ European directive on privacy protection
± http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html
z Open question
÷ How much privacy (anonymity) is valuable for the society?
>>> Privacy and Anonymity
Anonymous communication secure against traffic analysis
Information online ?
http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon/
±Demonstrations
±Downloads
±Links
